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1 Introduction
Early childhood years are recognized by various fields of research as a key stage in life, carrying the
power to shape future outcomes all the way through youth and into adulthood. There is a wide
consensus about early childhood assessments being good predictors for educational achievements
(Burchinal et al. 2010; Nelson and Sheridan 2011; Nguyen et al. 2016), labor market success (Le et al.
2005; Duncan, Ziol-Guest, and Kalil 2010) and health outcomes (Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson 2002).
What is more, a growing number of compelling studies has shown the ability of policy interventions in
those areas to produce significant impacts on later childhood years (Currie and Thomas 1995; Garces,
Thomas, and Currie 2002; Ludwig and Miller 2007; Magnuson, Ruhm, and Waldfogel 2007; Conti,
Heckman, and Pinto 2016) as well as on adult ages (Campbell, Ramey, et al. 2002; Heckman 2006;
Gertler et al. 2014; Conti and Heckman 2014), especially when disadvantaged children are targeted.
The majority of these studies looks at cognitive skill formation and derived outcomes.1 On the non-
cognitive side, psychological and pedagogical theory postulates that pre-kindergarten circumstances
and experiences are able to forge an adult’s spheres of anxiety and self-control (Gunnar and Barr 1998;
Kagan and Snidman 1999; Moffitt et al. 2011), self-esteem and motivation (Maslow 1943; Almlund
et al. 2011), socio-emotional intelligence and well-being (Phillips and Shonkoff 2000; Robinson 2007)
and aggressive behavior (Tremblay et al. 2004; Hahn et al. 2007). Nevertheless, rigorous, large-
sample evidence along these dimensions is both scarce – often due to the lack of high quality data
on outcomes – and decidedly mixed about the direction and size of impacts (Duncan and Magnuson
2013). The branch of research focusing on the antisocial behavior outcome best encompasses our
contribution, which looks at the causal relationship between early childhood education and criminal
propensity later in life.
Starting in the early Nineties, a Spanish national education reform boosted the availability of
high-quality public preschool. Due to the autonomy enjoyed by regional governments on educational
matters, the reform was implemented in a staggered manner, and substantial variation in public
preschool access arose both across time and across space. Different birth cohorts within the same
region and same birth cohorts across different regions were faced with diverse levels of preschool
access. We exploit such variation in our quantitative analysis by relating it to crime rates measured,
years later, for each of those birth cohorts and regions of origin. We find a negative impact of early
public preschool availability on crime rates in youth and young adulthood: a 1 percentage point
increase in preschool access back in the early 1990s yields 1.6% fewer criminal actions in the 2000s.
We focus on birth cohorts 1984 to 1997, which are homogeneous in terms of other important
1The most compelling of these studies exploit cross-sibling comparisons (Currie and Thomas 1995; Garces, Thomas,
and Currie 2002) and regression-discontinuity designs that take advantage of variation in Head Start funding rates
(Ludwig and Miller 2007). These studies find general evidence that Head Start participation has long-term benefits in
terms of schooling outcomes.
2
educational characteristics2 and are old enough to appear in our crime dataset later in time. Our
outcome of interest, crime rates, is drawn from a unique administrative dataset recording all criminal
actions with known offender that were committed across the Spanish region of Catalonia over the
years 2009 to 2014. The offenders we focus on are aged between 15 and 30 at the moment of their
offense.3 Among other details, we observe basic information about the offender, notably his/her birth
cohort and region of origin, and detailed information about the offense committed, among which its
date, location and type. Exploiting this information, in the second part of our analysis we are able
to assess the impact that the national preschool expansion program has had on different types of
crime separately, which helps us to form a more precise opinion on the potential mechanisms at
work behind our main results. Our findings suggest that the non-cognitive skills channel plays a
fundamental role in explaining the reduction in crime which followed the increased public preschool
access. The crime types on which we estimate the highest and most robust preschool impacts are
those of more impulsive, unplanned and irrational nature - in other words, those crimes for which
literature has found poor socio-emotional and behavioral skills to be important drivers.
Our outcome variable takes the shape of criminal action counts per 1,000 inhabitants, and we
employ negative binomial regression (NBR) modeling to estimate the relationship between crime
counts and preschool access rates. Our choice of using NBR modeling is motivated by the high
overdispersion of our outcome variable, and we find NBR to perform significantly better than the
more traditional Poisson choice, according to a variety of measures of fit. We discuss and provide
statistical evidence to support the assumptions behind our estimation strategy, among which those
on internal migration behavior and on the crime-age distribution. We perform a set of robustness
checks and placebo tests to corroborate our findings.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature which is
closest to our work. Section 3 presents the institutional background on preschool education in Spain,
and on the public preschool expansion occurred in the Nineties. Section 4 explains our empirical
framework and the data sources we draw on. Section 5 discusses the main assumptions underlying
our results, which are illustrated in Section 6 along with the potential mechanisms underlying these.
Section 7 provides further discussion of results, as well as strengths and potential shortcomings of
our analysis. Robustness checks and placebo tests are shown in Section 8 and Section 9 concludes.
Additionally, the Appendix presents descriptive statistics (A), analysis on model fit (B), additional
tables and figures which are supporting our analysis (C) as well as the information needed to perform
benefit-to-cost calculations derived from our estimates (D).
2Most importantly, school leaving age is 16 for all of them.
315 years is the minimum age at which offenses are recorded in our crime dataset.
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2 Review of the closest literature
Attending high quality preschool programs has been shown effective in increasing cognitive perfor-
mance, especially in the short run and in the case of individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds.
The strongest evidence on these aspects is based on the evaluation of US programs such as the Perry
program, Project CARE and the Abecedarian project (Heckman, Moon, Pinto, P. Savelyev, et al.
(2010), Heckman, Pinto, and P. Savelyev 2013), which share the characteristics of operating on a
small scale and being targeted at low-income families. The results of large scale interventions or
nationwide public preschool expansions are less unanimous. A 2017 an interdisciplinary task force
of experts assembled a report on the current state on the scientific knowledge on pre-kindergarten
effects, again based on studies focusing on the United States (Phillips, Lipsey, et al. 2017). The
consensus statement opening the report declares that convincing evidence is at hand about the ef-
fectiveness of preschool programs in preparing children for kindergarten on a cognitive level – while
the effects on social-emotional and self-regulatory development seem more modest and are addressed
by a much smaller amount of studies. The statement further highlights the lack of sufficient rigorous
evidence on the longer-term impacts of large-scale preschool programs, on which broad conclusions
are still unavailable. The following paragraphs review some of the most recent and compelling studies
published so far, gradually narrowing the view down to our specific contribution.
Effects of preschool programs on cognitive outcomes In terms of cognitive outcomes and
looking at larger-scale early childcare interventions, several studies find strong effects for disadvan-
taged groups but small or negligible effects on the remaining population (Blanden et al. 2016). In
Italy, Carta and Rizzica (2018) look at the subsidized expansion of preschool places for 2-year olds
but find no effects on cognitive skills later in childhood. Blanden et al. (2016) exploit the staggered
implementation of pre-school for three-year olds across Local Education Authorities in England in the
early 2000s, finding small improvements in attainment at age 5, but no apparent benefits by age 11,
and attributing the failure to low quality of some preschool centers. Universal child care programs
in Norway have been evaluated by Havnes and Mogstad (2011; 2015), who find positive earning
effects for children from low-income families but actual losses for upper-class children. Cornelissen
et al. (2017) look at an universal preschool program in Germany and exploit its staggered imple-
mentation across municipalities, finding that school entry examination gains from the program were
particularly high for children from disadvantaged backgrounds, but that these were also less likely to
enroll with respect to those from advantaged backgrounds. Dumas and Lefranc (2012) evaluate the
effect of a large preschool expansion program in France over the 60s and 70s, finding persistent and
inequality-reducing effects on educational and labor market outcomes.
Effects of preschool programs on non-cognitive outcomes The lack of consensus about
the effects of early childhood education on non-cognitive outcomes begins already in the short-term
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view, when looking at a few years after being exposed to the education programs. Loeb et al.
(2007) use data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study and through OLS, matching and
IV estimation, conclude that center-based preschool education has overall negative effect on socio-
behavioral measures at the start of kindergarten. On the contrary, Figlio and Roth (2009), looking at
children born in Florida from 1994 onwards and using differences in access within a family, find that
public pre- kindergarten participation reduces behavioral problems in elementary school, especially
when the child grows up in a particularly disadvantaged neighborhood. Similar positive conclusions
are drawn by Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler (2009), who find that third-grade Argentinian students
improved attention, participation, discipline and effort following attendance of pre-primary education.
Gupta and Simonsen (2010) find that in Denmark, compared to home care, enrollment in preschool
programs at age three does not lead to any significant differences in children’s outcomes at age 7.
Felfe and Lalive (2018) find that public preschool rollout in one German state induced significant
socio-emotional skill improvement measured at school-entry age, but especially so for children with
a lower propensity to attend preschool in first place.
Moving to the long-run horizon, there is a handful of studies including non-cognitive traits among
their outcomes of interest, and the lack of universal consensus about the effects persists. Campbell
et al. (2002; 2008) compare adult benefits for participants in Project CARE with those of the
Abecedarian Project, and find that the programs induced higher likelihoods of conducting healthy,
active adult lifestyles and reduced marijuana consumption. Nevertheless, no positive effects are found
on (self-reported) binge-drinking, driving after drinking and violence, while males were actually
found more likely to report breaking the law. Heckman, Moon, Pinto, P. Savelyev, et al. (2010)
and Conti, Heckman, and Pinto (2016) follow individuals from age 3 up to age 40 and show that
the Perry and Abecedarian programs had persistent positive impacts on academic motivation and
externalizing behaviors (such as aggressive, antisocial and rule-breaking behaviors), and in turn
significantly improved a range of adult outcomes including marriage, health, participation in healthy
behaviors and reduced participation in crime (Heckman, Pinto, and P. Savelyev 2013).
Long-run effects of preschool programs on violent behavior and crime Further nar-
rowing the focus around our contribution, Hahn et al. (2007) provide an excellent systematic review
of scientific evidence concerning the effectiveness of school-based programs to reduce or prevent vi-
olent behavior. The review looks at programs administered from pre-kindergarten to high school,
and finds positive impacts through all grade levels. The most important reductions in violent behav-
ior are found through interventions targeting the earliest ages, pre-kindergarten and kindergarten.
Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) use comparisons between siblings to look at longer-term effects
of the Head Start program. Beyond positive impacts on educational attainment for both blacks and
whites, they find that black children who participated in the program are less likely to have been
booked or charged with a crime by their early twenties, relative to their siblings who did not partici-
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pate. Schweinhart et al. (2005) study the long-term impacts of the Perry preschool program and find
particularly strong evidence on crime prevention: the program played a significant role in reducing
overall arrests and arrests for violent crimes as well as property and drug crimes and subsequent
prison or jail sentences, over study participants’ lifetimes up to age 40. Heckman et al. (2009; 2009;
2010) confirm that crime reduction is a major benefit of the Perry program and find that program
treatment effects mainly operate through enhancing non-cognitive or behavioral skills that are very
predictive of criminal behavior. This more recent literature distanced itself from the traditional view
and findings that non-maternal forms of daycare have adverse effects on the socio-emotional devel-
opment of the child (Schwarz, Strickland, and Krolick 1974; Baers 1954), and especially on anxiety
and anger (Bowlby 1958; 1973).
Studies on the Spanish context Looking at the Spanish context, to the best of our knowledge
there are no studies linking preschool education and aggressive behavior or criminal outcomes. On
the other hand, there are a few studies exploring the causal relationship between early childhood
education and educational results. Hidalgo-Hidalgo and García-Pérez (2012) find a positive impact
of preschool on results in language, mathematics and reading using TIMSS-PIRLS data. Santín and
Sicilia (2015) use 2009 data from the General Diagnostic Evaluation prepared by the Spanish Ministry
of Education, and find a positive impact of more years of preschool on academic results at 4th grade.
Similarly to this paper, Felfe, Nollenberger, and Rodríguez-Planas (2015) look at the expansion of
public preschool during the early Nineties, studying its impact on PISA test performance. They find
a positive impact on reading and math scores, more pronounced for girls and for students with low
socioeconomic background.
3 Institutional and educational background
For a good understanding of our setting, it is important to describe the Spanish institutional and
educational context at the time around which the early Nineties public preschool expansion occurred.
Preschool education had been formally existing in the public educational system since 1970 (that
is, since the LGE – the General Law on Education), distinguishing between two levels: Jardín de
Infancia (“Kindergarten”, for children aged below 3) and Escuela de Párvulos (“Nursery school” for
children aged 4 to 5) - the attendance to both of which was voluntary. However, the educational
regime of that time did not attribute high priority to preschool, since public funds were urgently
needed to cater for children of compulsory schooling ages – who had outnumbered forecasts due
to the Spanish baby-boom that had occurred in the Sixties. As a result, during the Seventies and
Eighties, the public preschool offer was very limited and mostly directed to cover the most compelling
needs of the most socially vulnerable categories, while private preschool initiatives grew in importance
but lacked a legal framework or quality scrutiny by authorities (Berea 1992; González 2004).
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Over the late Seventies and Eighties, public preschool access for 4 and 5-year olds increased
quite rapidly. Preschool classes for children of those ages were typically annexed to existing primary
schools, and they were in high demand as families became increasingly aware of the advantages
of early education, and as this form of early schooling became a way of securing a spot in their
preferred primary school center (Berea 1992). Nevertheless, the predominance of the unregulated
private sector over daycare for children aged 3 and below continued, with great heterogeneity in
type of ownership, skills and credentials of staff, and prices. These nurseries were mainly viewed as
‘day-custody’ centers (guarderías in Spanish) and generally carried very little educational content
(González 2004).4 Besides this scarce and disordered formal offer, informal daycare arrangements
through members of the extended family or friends were the only available resource for many working
mothers - who characterized around 18% of Spanish families by the early Eighties (“Situación social
de la mujer en España” 1986; Del Campo Urbano 1986).
Age three preschool expansion
It was not until 1990 that the educational system was deeply reformed. The new educational law,
LOGSE (Ley Orgánica General del Sistema Educativo, October 1990), aimed at embracing the evolv-
ing socio-economic reality of Spain, as well as adapting to the increasingly decentralized allocation
of sectoral competencies which had been taking shape over the previous decade.
The new regulation classified preschool years into two voluntary education cycles: the first for
ages 0 to 2 and the second for ages 3 to 5. None of the two cycles was offered as a completely free
public service, but they were heavily subsidized, so that families covered only around 12% of the
total cost of a preschool spot, and the rest was sustained by local governments.5 As a result, the fee
users were facing for a public spot was multiple times lower than the ones prevalent on the private
sector. The transition between the last year of preschool and the first year of primary school was
made automatic: children who attended the last preschool year in a specific education center acquired
the right to remain in that center during primary school years (ages 6 to 11). In fact, this policy
shifted the moment of primary school choice back to the start of the second cycle of preschool, i.e.
to age three. As a consequence, educational centers offering exclusively preschool cycles gradually
4Sociologists and historians have provided several explanations for the slow expansion of public daycare for the
very young in Spain. By some, it has been interpreted as the result of an explicit social rejection of all kind of measures
that could be associated with the earlier Franco dictatorship, which had tried to invade private family lives through
fertility policies ((Iglesias de Ussel 1994; Valiente Fernandéz 1997; González 2004)). Another explanation proposed
was the lack of measures for gender equality and women’s labor participation in the Spanish political agenda. Finally,
cultural aspects may have also played a role, such as the widespread opinion that the best care for early childhood
came from maternal care ((Valiente Fernandéz 1997; González 2004)).
5Data from the region of Andalusia for the school year 1994 (“Temporeros y educación”, 1997). In terms of number
of available spots and access conditions, we note that Article 7.2 of LOGSE states "Preschool education is voluntary.
The public administrations guarantees the existence of a sufficient number of places to ensure schooling for those who
request it". However, the degree of compliance to this rule may have varied across different regions. Also, regions were
the ones deciding upon access priorites and exact fees (see González and Vidal Torre 2005) .
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started losing demand, in favor of centers offering second cycle preschool as well as primary school
(“centros de infantil y primaria”) – which increasingly offer new matriculation to 3-year olds and
rarely to older children. The 1990 LOGSE reform triggered a significant and rapid expansion of early
public preschool services, and especially so for three-year-old children. Figure 1 shows the evolution
of early preschool enrollment rates at national level, and Figure 2 separates rates for 0-2 year-olds
and 3-year-olds - for those years in which enrollment data started to be collected separately by exact
age.


































Note: Age 0-3 enrollment rates in Spain, by school year. Public preschool
rates in solid black, private ones in solid grey and total ones dashed.
Under the new legal framework, the institutional view about the role of preschool was also re-
visited, transitioning from the previous ‘day-custody’ perspective to a proper educational stage –
the goals of which were set to promote the physical, intellectual, social, affective and personal de-
velopment, and to compensate for any existing inequalities. National preschool education guidelines
instructed to teach children self-awareness, personal autonomy, knowledge of the environment, com-
munication and representation skills. In other words, beyond preparing children for later academic
stages on a cognitive level, the reformed Spanish public preschool heavily promoted the development
of non-cognitive skills, recognizing their importance for children’s comfort and success in social en-
vironments. Finally, through the new norms preschool classes for three-year olds were limited to a
maximum of 20 pupils and their teachers were required to possess a university degree.
In their article, Blanden et al. (2016) observe that three important factors may influence the results
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Note: Enrolment rates in Spain for age groups 0-2 (bottom three lines) and
3 (top three lines) separately, by school year. Public preschool rates in solid
black, private ones in solid grey and total ones dashed.
of an expansion of childcare, in terms of children’s development: the intensity of the additional
provision, the quality of the newly provided childcare and the quality of the counterfactual care.
Following this useful structure and based on what was described in this Section, we categorize the
Spanish public preschool expansion during Nineties as high-intensity, high quality, and arisen in
a context of relatively low-quality alternative options.6 Given the quality characteristics of the
renovated public system, one would expect a positive impact of the Spanish preschool expansion on
the development of 3-year old children. Regarding the intensity aspect, we agree with Blanden et al.
(2016) in saying that the effects are more difficult to predict - given that preschool access for young
children generates a tradeoff between losing time with parents, gaining professional education time,
and probably enjoying better economic opportunities through increased labor market participation
of parents (Brewer et al. 2014; Berlinski and Galiani 2007). We will come back to this point when
discussing our results.
6Although it did contribute towards the regulation of minimum standards to be met by private childcare providers,
which had been, as described earlier, completely unregulated until then.
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3.1 The role of subnational governments and the staggered preschool ex-
pansion
The decentralization of educational competences from the national to the regional level started in
Spain during the early Eighties and protracted itself until the late Nineties - going hand in hand
with the gradual, wider political decentralization process that occurred in those years. As the new
educational regulations were approved in 1990, Spanish regions (Comunidades Autónomas) were in
the midst of the process of taking over educational responsibilities - with substantial heterogeneity
in the degree to which the transition was complete, ranging from ‘not yet started’ to ‘fully transi-
tioned’. Overall, more than 50% of the public education expenditure was administered by regional
governments at that time - and the figure would rise to above 80% over the opening decade (Calero
and Bonal 2004).7
As a result of their decisional and budgetary autonomy, and of the cross-regional differences in
those matters, the timing of the expansion of public supply of early preschool places varied consid-
erably across the eighteen Spanish regions. Figure 3 shows the regional evolution of early preschool
enrollment rates, which we take as our measure of preschool access. Interpreting enrollment rates
as access rates makes the implicit assumption the availability of public preschool was below the
demand for it - that is, the supply side was binding. This assumption is supported by the fact
that new educational requirements dictated by LOGSE were heavily underfunded, and that non-
compulsory education stages such as preschool suffered the heaviest consequences, struggling to meet
society’s needs and expectations (Calero and Bonal 1999; Rambla and Bonal 2000; Bonal et al. 2005).
Preschool-specific literature confirms how how excess demand for public preschool places was and
still is an ever present feature of the Spanish context (Felfe, Nollenberger, and Rodríguez-Planas
2015; González and Vidal Torre 2006; González and Vidal Torre 2005; González 2004; González and
Quiroga 2003; Berea 1992).
3.1.1 Determinants of the cross-regional heterogeneity
Given that the cross-regional variation in preschool access lies at the heart of our empirical identifi-
cation strategy, it is important to understand its origins – and to establish whether these might be
directly or indirectly related to our outcome of interest, crime prevalence by region of origin.
Several studies on the topic have failed to identify any single most important determinant ex-
plaining the timing in the adoption of the 1990 educational rules across Spanish regions, or justifying
7On the other hand, the involvement of the more local level (provinces and municipalities) in educational matters
is, in general, quite limited in Spain. Using budgetary data from the Spanish Ministry of Economics for 2001 we can
compute the share of public expenditures devoted to education by local governments . For instance, municipalities
in Andalusia devoted on average 3.5% and provinces 2.3% of their total expenditures to education, while in Catalo-
nia it was 5.5% and 7.5% respectively. URL: http://serviciostelematicosext.minhap.gob.es/SGCAL/entidadeslocales/
(accessed November 2018).
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Note: Age 0-3 enrollment rates by Spanish region and school year. Public preschool
rates in solid black, private ones in solid grey and total ones dashed.
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the territorial differences in public preschool supply (González and Quiroga 2003; Flaquer and Oliver
2002). Differences in education policy have been attributed to a complex blend of local wealth, po-
litical opinions on priorities, differences in local financing models, as well as differences in the local
socioeconomic structure such as past history, economic development, demographic distribution and
migration (Bonal et al. 2005). Other studies have related public childcare supply to population size
and its concentration, to private households’ income and to women’s presence in local government
(González and Vidal Torre 2005).
Based on this literature, we want to assess whether we are able to identify any significant rela-
tionship between public early preschool expansion and regional characteristics in our setup and with
our data, in order to adequately control for these in our empirical model. In Table 1, we regress early
preschool enrollment rates at the regional level for the period 1987-2000 on a number of potential
determinants: to proxy for institutional and financial factors, we insert a dummy variable for the 1990
LOGSE reform; the regional public capital expenditure as % of GDP; the per capita stock of public
infrastructures devoted to education. To account for socio-economic factors, we introduce regional
GDP per capita; youth (16-19) unemployment rate and the education level of active population. We
account for the expansion of the female employment rate with data from the Economically Active
Population Survey (INE),8 although it is not clear whether female labor force participation should
be viewed as a determinant or an outcome of early childcare expansion. We also introduce a dummy
variable indicating the regional government with a left party in government, in order to account for
political preferences of regional governments towards educational policies.
Beyond these ‘usual’ factors, it is important for our setting to assess the presence of any correlation
between early preschool access and contemporaneous crime rates, back in the Nineties. If such a
correlation existed, it would become harder to argue that any impact of preschool found on future
crime rates does not actually reflect a spurious relationship that has been existing historically. For
the 1990s, there is no availability of detailed crime data of the same sort we employ for our main
analysis on the 2000s; however, we retrieved data from the General Attorney’s Office from the Spanish
Ministry of Justice, recording regional court activity, which constitutes a fairly good proxy for crime
rates.9
After controlling for regional and year fixed effects, only the LOGSE reform dummy variable shows
a statistically significant relationship with early preschool enrollment rates. In line with previous
literature, we do not detect any further significant correlation between the regional expansion pattern
of public preschool and the potential expansion determinants we have considered.10
8Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows the positive correlation between the activity rate of women with at least one
child 0-2 and the percentage of children aged 0-2 schooled per province in 2001.
9The correlation between provincial court data and provincial crime data obtained from the Spanish Ministry for
Home Affairs show a correlation of 87.18% over the period 1993-1999.
10We have performed various robustness exercises to the results presented in Table 1 and we obtain very similar
results using as dependent variable total preschool enrollment rates, and using as potential determinants current
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Table 1: Determinants of regional public preschool enrollment rates (0-3), 1987-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LOGSE reform 0.21*** 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 0.19**
(0.05, ) (0.08, ) (0.08, ) (0.08, ) (0.08, )
Public capital expenditures (% GDP) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
(0.06, ) (0.06, ) (0.06, ) (0.06, ) (0.06, )
Stock of public capital in education pc –0.09 –0.10 –0.10 –0.11 –0.13
(0.12, ) (0.11, ) (0.11, ) (0.10, ) (0.11, )
GDP pc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00, ) (0.00, ) (0.00, ) (0.00, )
Young unemployment/1,000p –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.01
(0.04, ) (0.04, ) (0.04, ) (0.04, )
Education level active population –0.11 –0.12 –0.17 –0.19
(0.18, ) (0.18, ) (0.21, ) (0.20, )
Female labor force participation –0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.19, ) (0.20, ) (0.21, )
Court activity pc –0.13 –0.12
(0.25, ) (0.26, )
Left party in government –0.01
(0.01, )
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3
Region FE 3 3 3 3 3
Mean(y) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
sd(y) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
N.obs 238 238 238 238 238
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Data sources: GDP > Spanish Ministry of Finance and
Public Administration; stock of public capital in education and education of active population >
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, IVIE; GDP per capita and youth unemploy-
ment > Source: Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE). The education level of active popu-
lation is defined as the percentage of working-age population with only primary education or less.
expenditures as a share of GDP (instead of capital expenditures) or the education level of the employed population
(instead of the education level of the active population).
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4 Empirical strategy and data
4.1 Early preschool access




Total children aged (0-3)c+3,i
where c indexes birth cohorts and i indexes Spanish regions of origin. For example, the early preschool
exposure of a child born in Andalusia in 1990 is measured as the number of preschool attendees among
children aged 0-3 registered in Andalusia in the year 1993, over the total number of children aged
0-3 living in Andalusia in 1993. Data on regional preschool enrollment stems from the records of the
Spanish Ministry of Education11 and data on resident children is provided by population series (by
region of origin and year of birth) from the Spanish National Statistics Agency (INE).12
Only from the academic year 1993/94 onward the Ministry has been collecting enrollment infor-
mation by each age separately, while until that point it was done by age groups 0-3 and 4-5. This
makes it unfeasible for us to use original enrollment figures for three-year olds only, so we were faced
with the choice of using rates for the 0-3 age group or resorting to imputation strategies to single out
3-year olds. We chose the former option because in our setting it is crucial to work with unaltered
evolutions of regional enrollment rates, and any arbitrary imputation choice may cause unwanted dis-
tortions. Additionally, Figure 2 showed how enrollment rates of 0-2 year olds are both very low and
quite stationary over our period of analysis. As a consequence, by using the overall 0-3 enrollment
rates, we are certainly underestimating the true preschool access of 3-year olds, but are unlikely to
significantly alter the over-time variation in rates – which is what mostly matters for our empirical
analysis.
Returning to our definition of preschool access, and in the light of the previous considerations, we
measure early preschool access for cohort c born in region i as the enrollment rates for 0-3 year olds
which were recorded in that region i in school year c+ 3 – that is, when our reference birth cohort c
is three years old.
11“Estadística de la Enseñanza en España. Niveles de preescolar, general básica y enseñanzas medias”, Ministerio
de Educación y Ciencia, eds. 1987/88 - 2000/2001. We use public enrollment data for our main specifications, but
also show results for total enrollment (public + private) in our robustness checks (see Section 8).
12More specifically, from the Municipal Register of resident population (2000-2014).
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4.2 Criminal outcomes
We have administrative data on crime actions committed by identified offenders in each municipality
in the region of Catalonia over the years 2009-2014.13 Available information includes date and region
of birth of the crime author, timing and location of the crime action, and a classification of the type





with count of crime actions at the numerator and count of residents at the denominator. That is,
Cc,i,m,y measures crimes per 1,000 residents belonging to birth cohort c, born in region i and living
in Catalan municipality m in year y. Resuming the example used for preschool access, we construct
measures of crime rates among young adults born in the region of Andalusia in the year 1990 and
living in the municipality of Barcelona in 2009, 2010, and so forth for all Catalan municipalities and
years 2009-2014.
4.3 Overdispersion and negative binomial regression
Our outcome variable is count data – number of criminals per 1,000 residents – and is characterized
by high dispersion. This can be observed looking at descriptive statistics in Table A.1, in which
crime rate variance shows multiple times higher than its mean, as well as in Figure 4 here below,
revealing a large mass at zero14 and a long right tail. Given the need to accommodate both count data
features and high dispersion in the outcome variable, we opt for negative binomial (NB) regression
as our preferred estimation strategy: negative binomial regression models the number of occurrences
of an event when the event has extra-Poisson variation, that is, when overdispersion occurrs. The
remainder of this Section illustrates our modeling strategy more formally, following Cameron and
Trivedi (2010), Long and Freese (2014) and Hilbe (2011).
In negative binomial regression, the outcome variable yj is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution
whose parameter µ∗j – representing expected counts and their variance – is a function of a covariate
vector xj , a parameter vector β and an unobserved component νj . The unobserved component νj is
what differentiates the NB model from the Poisson model, allowing for over-dispersion in observed
outcomes by adding an observation-specific element. The unobserved component it is such that eνj
follows a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance α, where α is known as the overdispersion
13Source: Catalan police authority (Mossos d’Esquadra).
14Notice that in our setting the large mass at zero does not call for a “zero-inflated” modeling strategy. The basic
assumption behind such strategies is the presence of an ‘excess’ mass of zero-outcomes, due to the fact that part of the
population does not participate in the count-generating process – or in other words, for part of the population there is no
chance to observe any outcome different from zero. In our case however, we do not have any reasons to assume or impose
zero-counts, a priori, for any specific (birth cohort, region of origin, municipality of residence, year of observation) tu-
ple.
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Figure 4: Crime rates distribution
fraction
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Note: The figure plots the distribution of crime rates in our sample. The fraction at 0
(83%) and the fraction beyond 1,000 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants (0.2%) are omitted
from the graph for the sake of clarity.
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where j indexes single observations, and
µ∗j = exp (xjβ + νj) = exp (µj + νj)
and
evj ∼ Gamma (1/α, α)
This model allows for dispersion to depend on the expected mean of each observation. However,
we do not allow the dispersion parameter α to vary across observations, that is, we are estimating a
single α for our entire crime dataset.16
We always compare our preferred NB specifications to the naive OLS option – which does not
appropriately account for neither the count nature of the outcome variable nor for its overdispersion
– and to the Poisson alternative with robust standard errors which produces unbiased coefficient
estimates but whose fit to the data is decidedly inferior to NB (see Appendix B).
4.4 Estimation approach
In order to estimate the causal effect of early preschool on criminal behavior, we exploit the variation
in preschool access both across regions of origin and across birth cohorts. Since each Spanish region
expanded early public preschool following its own timeline, individuals belonging to the same birth
cohort are more or less likely to have attended preschool at age three, depending on which region
they spent their early childhood in. At the same time, individuals from the same region of origin
faced different probabilities of age three preschool attendance, depending on the birth cohort they
belong to.
In our baseline specification, the covariate vector xj simply includes early preschool access and
fixed effects for birth-cohort and region of origin. That is, our empirical model equation is the
following:
15The higher α, the larger the overdispersion; with α = 0 we are back to the Poisson regression model.
16In our main analysis we are also abstracting from the so-called ‘offset’ variables, which can be included into the
NB model to allow for outcome events yj to be observed over different amounts of exposure, and whose coefficients
are constrained to 1. We thus consider the amount of exposure to be homogeneous across our crime counts. In other
robustness specifications (not shown, but available upon request), we introduce age as the exposure variable: individual
age during our observation window 2009-2014 may determine the likelihood of being observed engaging in criminal













where Cc indicate cohort dummies and Ri indicate region of origin dummies. This baseline speci-
fication represents the core of our identification strategy: variation in criminal behavior is associated
to variation in early preschool access over time and space, after accounting for birth cohort effects
and region of origin effects.
In order to test the robustness of our estimates against a number of potential concerns, we
gradually allow expected outcomes to depend on further elements. We introduce local fixed effects
and controls to reduce potential omitted variable bias arising from characteristics of the local area
in which crime actions are committed. We also introduce year fixed effects to reduce potential bias
associated with the timing of crime actions. Finally, we introduce controls for conditions faced by
individuals during childhood in their regions of origin, beyond the level of early preschool access,
to alleviate concerns about other time-varying factors correlating to preschool exposure and co-
determining later criminal behavior. Our most complete specification can be illustrated as follows:
Cc,i,m,y = exp
(















where Vp indicate province dummies, Mm indicates a vector of municipal control variables (un-
employment rates, number of police officers per 1, 000 inhabitants, municipal revenues per capita,
municipal expenditures per capita),17 Yy indicate year dummies and Zc,i indicates a vector of cohort-
region of origin controls (GDP per capita and unemployment rates). As will be illustrated in Section
6, our results remain considerably robust throughout these additions, corroborating the validity of
our more parsimonious baseline specification.
Recall that in our setup, each observation refers to a tuple ‘birth cohort c, born in region i, living
in municipality m, in year y’. Our main sample consists of 153,924 such (c, i,m, y) combinations.
We look at the 10 birth cohorts between 1984 and 1993, there are 18 regions in Spain,18 and 948
municipalities in Catalonia, which we observe over 6 years (2009-2014). However, not all cohort-
region combinations are found in all municipalities and in all years: that is, in some municipalities
and in some years, there are no residents born in region i in cohort c. Figure A.2 in the Appendix
illustrates the composition of our sample indicating the share of observations by each region of origin
and each birth cohort: as expected, the single most represented region of origin is Catalonia (almost
17Because of the large number of municipalities (over 900), we opt for introducing province dummies and municipal-
level controls rather than municipality dummies. We always cluster standard errors at the municipality level.
1817 Autonomous Communities plus the two Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla considered jointly.
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all Catalan-born cohorts are represented in every Catalan municipality and year), but the remaining
regions constitute a sample fraction going from around 60% for older cohorts to around 45% for
younger ones (younger cohorts born in other regions have had less time to migrate to Catalonia and
are thus less likely to occur in our sample).
5 Assumptions behind the empirical setup
This section discusses the main assumptions on which our identification approach is based. The first
concerns the correspondence between region of birth and region of residence at preschool age. The
second concerns the possible impact of preschool access on cross-regional migration patterns and
on crime-age profiles.19 Next, we describe each assumption in more detail, we present statistical or
descriptive evidence backing it, and we discuss how its failure would affect our results.
5.1 Region of birth and region of residence at preschool age
Given that both our data on offenders and our data on population residing in Catalonia provide
region of birth but not region of residence at age three, we assume that individuals were still residing
in their region of birth at age three, and were thus exposed to the preschool expansion pattern that
occurred in that region. Another way to view this is we assume that individuals born in regions
different from Catalonia have migrated to Catalonia after the age of three.
Mobility of children under the age of 3 is quite low across Spanish regions, as we can observe in
Table 2. For each Spanish region, Table 2 shows the discrepancies between the number of children
born in a specific year and the number of 3-year olds residing in the same region three years later
in time. Discrepancies are expressed in % differences and are averaged across cohorts 1984 to 1997.
The average 3-year old resident cohort is only 0.22% smaller than the respective birth cohort; the
maximum discrepancy is found in the Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla (-1.47%) and in the
Basque Country (-1.44%). Internal migration of very young children thus seemed quite limited for
the cohorts we work with.20
Those young adults who were not residing in their region of birth at age three are allocated
a wrong preschool exposure level in our analysis. If completely at random, the presence of such
mismatches weakens any true relationship that there might be between outcome (crime) and predictor
19A further implicit assumption in our analysis concerns the construction of our outcome variable, criminal behavior
(see section 4.2). Our municipal crime rates Ci,c,m view criminals as forming part of the resident population in the
municipality in which they commit the crime, thus ignoring the possibility of having crimes “away from home” (i.e.,
in another municipality). Nevertheless, this assumption ought not to play a particularly important role: if criminals
commit crime actions in municipalities different from the one of residence, ‘true’ crime rates will be inflated in the
former but deflated in the latter, merely contributing to estimation noise. A more careful treatment of this kind of
criminal mobility goes beyond the scope of this paper.
20Even more so if we note that cohort sizes are eroded over time also by migration abroad and child deaths.
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Table 2: Residence and birth region for 3-year olds across Spain
% difference % difference
Andalusia –0.18 Valencia 0.97
Aragon –0.03 Extremadura –1.16
Asturias –1.16 Galicia 0.27
Balearic Islands –0.30 Madrid –0.64
Canary Islands 0.02 Murcia –0.03
Cantabria 0.00 Navarre 0.41
Castilla y Leon –0.74 Basque Country –1.44
Castilla-La Mancha 0.31 Rioja 1.30
Catalonia –0.11 Ceuta and Melilla –1.47
Note: For each Spanish region, the table shows the percentage difference between the size of the 3-year
old residents cohort and the size of the respective birth cohort (average across birth cohorts 1984-1997).
Source: municipal residence records, elaborated by the Spanish National Statistics Agency (INE).
(preschool), and thus works against being able to pin down any significant effect. Nevertheless, a
non-random misallocation could potentially bias our results in any direction. Therefore, despite the
low childhood mobility we document, we correct for it in Section 8 by constructing a between-region
transition probability matrix and weighting our estimates accordingly, following the method by Card
and Krueger (1992). We show that our main results remain essentially unaltered.
5.2 Impacts of preschool exposure on cross-regional migration and on the
crime-age distribution
The changes in criminal activity we observe across Catalan municipalities may reflect an actual
modification of criminal attitudes in individuals that were exposed to the public preschool program,
i.e. a real treatment effect. On the other hand, the observed changes may potentially encompass
compositional effects as well, if preschool access affects cross-regional migration decisions or the age
at which crime is committed. We address these concerns with a battery of exercises investigating
any relationship between preschool exposure, migration behavior and crime-age distributions.
One might argue that increased preschool access at their regions of origin decreases the likelihood
for children and young adults to migrate to Catalonia - while their crime propensity has not changed.
Then, we would observe reduced crime rates in Catalonia and misinterpret these as a treatment effect
when they instead embody mere changes in the observed sample which correlate with preschool ac-
cess. Therefore, we first check whether our preschool exposure measure has any predictive power on
the quantity of internal migrants that we observe in Catalonia. Internal migrants are individuals be-
longing to our birth cohorts (1984-1997) that we observe residing in Catalonia during our observation
window (2009-2014) and were born in a different Spanish region. Table 3 shows OLS regressions of
the share of internal migrants on a number of potential migration determinants, including preschool
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exposure. After accounting for cohort and region of birth fixed effects, we do not find any evidence
for preschool exposure affecting the probability of migrating to Catalonia.
Table 3: Determinants of migration to Catalonia (2009-2014)
(1) (2) (3)
Public preschool rate (0-3) –0.04*** 0.00 0.00
(0.01, ) (0.01, ) (0.01, )
GDP pc (age 3) 0.01
(0.18, )
Unemployment (age 3) 0.00*
(0.00, )
Year of birth FE 3 3
Region of birth FE 3 3
Year FE 3
Mean(y) 0.01 0.01 0.01
sd(y) 0.01 0.01 0.01
N.obs 1,428 1,428 1,428
R-squared 0.22 0.86 0.87
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Our second exercise aims at understanding whether preschool access might affect not the quantity
but the type of internal migration. To do so, we look for our birth cohorts in 2011 Census data21 and
we classify individuals into migrants or stayers according to their residence and birth information.
We then cross-tabulate the individual characteristics of the two groups against quintiles of preschool
exposure, looking for any significant trends in the differences between migrants and stayers. Figure 5
illustrates our exercise graphically and Table A.6 in Appendix C shows the detailed figures underlying
the graphs. According to our results, differences in education or labor market activity do not seem
to correlate with preschool access in any systematic way.22
Finally, the interpretation of our main results may change if preschool merely changed the timing
or the age dispersion of criminal behavior among youths - rather than its intensity. Similarly to the
arguments regarding migration behavior, if preschool affects the timing of crime, our results might be
21We employ the 5-percent Census microdata sample available for public use (INE.es).
22In a similar exercise shown in Table A.6, also in appendix C, we perform logit and ordered logit regressions of
migrants’ observables on preschool exposure, cohort and birth region fixed effects. This strategy also fails to spot any
correlation between migrants’ characteristics and preschool. We repeat the quintile-based exercise for internal migrants
to Catalonia only, which yields noisier results due to very small sample sizes for migrants. The graphical results are
reported in Figure A.5.
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Note: For internal migrants and stayers, the figure plots shares of individuals by completed education level (Lower
Secondary, Higher Secondary, University or equivalent), activity status (working or studying versus neither) and
part-time work (yes or no) in each quintile of preschool exposure. The difference in shares is dotted, and 95%
confidence intervals are capped. Source: 2011 Census microdata (5-Percent Public Use Microdata Sample).
Table A.6 in the Appendix shows the figures on which the graphs are drawn.
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reflecting a change in the observed sample rather than a true treatment effect. With the regressions
shown in Table 4 we verify whether characteristics of the crime-age distributions are correlated with
our preschool exposure measure. The dependent variables are peak crime age, low crime age, peak-
to-low ratios, standard deviation and kurtosis of the crime-age distribution; independent variables are
preschool exposure and the usual cohort and region fixed effects. We do not find preschool to carry
any predictive power on the shape characteristics of observed crime-age distributions, mitigating
concerns about compositional effects of the sort described underlying our results.
Table 4: Characteristics of the crime age distributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Peak age Low age Peak / Low sd kurtosis
Public preschool rate (0-3) –0.12 0.09 1.27 –0.73 0.81
(0.14, ) (0.29, ) (2.49, ) (2.14, ) (0.66, )
Year of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3
Region of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3
Mean(y) 21.05 20.76 4.10 41.02 2.21
sd(y) 3.29 5.25 3.31 46.50 0.70
N.obs 1,512 1,512 954 1,512 1,482
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.01
alpha 0.00 0.00 0.05*** 0.28*** 0.00
Note: SE clustered by region of origin in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
6 Main results and potential mechanisms
Table 5 illustrates our main results. Column 1 shows that the most basic relationship between early
preschool exposure and crime rates, without accounting for neither birth cohort nor region of origin
effects, is negative and significant: that is, higher levels of early preschool are on average associated
with lower crime rates. Column 2 shows the results of our baseline model (1), which represents our
preferred baseline specification. Columns 3 to 5 show the results of increasingly rich specifications,
as previously described in Section 4.4, and Column 5 corresponds to our most complete model (2).
As we can see, the estimates for public preschool rates remain robust to the inclusion of various local
and time fixed effects and controls, corroborating our assumption that, in this Spanish context we
are examining, variation in public preschool rates can be considered as good as randomly assigned
23
after conditioning on birth cohort and region of origin.23
Table 5: The effect of early preschool access on crime rates
Negative Binomial Poisson OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Public preschool rate (0-3) –3.21*** –1.60*** –1.59*** –1.64*** –1.37* –1.00 –52.54**
(0.22, ) (0.53, ) (0.54, ) (0.63, ) (0.72, ) (0.64, ) ,(25.32, )
Unemployment/1,000p 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.47***
(0.00, ) (0.00, ) (0.00, ) (0.08, )
Police/1,000p 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.13*** 4.78***
(0.04, ) (0.04, ) (0.03, ) (1.25, )
Mun. revenue pc –0.19 –0.19 –0.32* –7.63*
(0.12, ) (0.12, ) (0.19, ) (4.09, )
Mun. expenditure pc 0.18 0.18 0.33* 8.59*
(0.13, ) (0.13, ) (0.20, ) (4.46, )
GDP pc (age 3) –41.27 –33.21 203.93
,(33.55, ) ,(32.32, ) (,865.68, )
Unemployment (age 3) –0.01 –0.01 –0.44
(0.01, ) (0.02, ) (0.59, )
Year of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Region of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Province FE 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3
Mean(y) 29.69 29.69 29.69 29.69 29.69 29.69 29.69
sd(y) 160.02 160.02 160.02 160.02 160.02 160.02 160.02
N.obs 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924
R-squared 0.01
Pseudo R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
alpha 36.29*** 35.84*** 35.70*** 35.24*** 35.24***
Note: SE clustered by municipality in parentheses. Each observation represents cohort ‘c’ born in
region ‘i’ living in Catalan municipality ‘m’ in year ‘y’. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
In terms of magnitudes, our main results imply that for an average birth cohort of children, a 1
23Another way to express this is that, conditional on birth cohort and region of origin controls, potential (or
‘counterfactual’) criminal behavior C0 of each group of residents is mean-independent of the level of public preschool
exposure it received: E[C0c,i|Cc, Ri, Pc,i] = E[C0c,i|Cc, Ri], where Cc,i = C0c,i if Pc,i = 0.
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percentage point increase in public preschool exposure at the region of origin yields 1.6% fewer crime
actions during young adulthood, in the years 2009-2014. That is after taking into account region of
origin, birth cohort, time and local fixed effects, as well as a battery of local time-varying controls.24
The literature on preschool impacts points at two main potential mechanisms behind our results:
an improvement in cognitive skills and an improvement in non-cognitive or socio-emotional skills,
both of which have the potential to lead to a reduction of criminal activities. An improvement in
cognitive skills lower crime propensity through better economic opportunities and higher income from
legal activities - as outlined in the groundbreaking economic model by Becker (1968). Somewhat less
salient in the Economics literature but widely documented in criminology, medical and psychological
literature, improvements on the non-cognitive dimension such as more self-control and lower tendency
to aggressive behavior reduce criminal occurrences through criminal impulse moderation (among
many others, see Wikström and Svensson 2010; Wikström and Treiber 2007; Burt, R. L. Simons, and
L. G. Simons 2006; Cauffman, Steinberg, and Piquero 2005; Junger and Tremblay 1999; Burton Jr
et al. 1998; White et al. 1994; Keane, Maxim, and Teevan 1993; Brownfield and Sorenson 1993;
Hirschi 1969).
In order to obtain a better understanding of which mechanism is more likely to be at play in our
context, we enter a more detailed analysis of crime categories. Given that we are able to exploit an
unusually rich and accurate crime dataset, we classify crime actions in types according to their most
likely kind of underlying motivation. Subsequently, we estimate our empirical model separately by
crime categories and verify which of them are most responsive to preschool access.
An initial and broad classification, typically found in the literature, is between property and
violent crime. This division, although loose, can be viewed as moving towards our purpose: for
property crime actions, the economic reward is typically the main goal for offenders. On the other
hand, violent crime often arises from situations in which the economic reward is not the primary
trigger. Property crime is the most common type of offense recorded in our dataset (54.01%)25
and is mainly composed by theft, robberies, damages to property (vandalism), motor vehicle theft,
misappropriation, fraud, falsity and house occupation. Violent crime (25.49%) includes injuries,
threats, gender violence, mistreatments within the family, evasion of family responsibilities and sexual
crimes. Finally there is third typology of actions that is hard to classify as either property or violent
crimes, which we label as “other crimes”, accounting for 20.50% of total recorded crimes in our dataset:
these are mostly composed by offenses against road safety, drug offenses and public-order offenses.26
24Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) find that, after controlling for mother fixed effects, children who attended
Head Start are 8,5 percentage points less likely to have been booked or charged with a crime by age 30 with respect
to their siblings who did not attend the program.
25Property crime is a crime to obtain money, property, or some other benefit. This may involve force, or the threat
of force, in cases like robbery or extortion. Since these crimes are committed in order to enrich the perpetrator they
are considered property crimes.
26We have labelled as public-order offenses basically resistance and disobedience to the authority, prevarication,
obstruction to justice, conspiracy and those offenses committed by public servants.
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Table A.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the different types of crime analyzed.
Table 6 shows the results of estimating our empirical model separately for property crime, violent
crime and other types of crimes; the set of controls used in Columns 1 to 7 correspond to those used
in the respective columns of the main results Table 5. Following a 1 percentage point increase in
preschool access, depending on the specification, violent crime is reduced by between 1.1% and 1.97%,
crime against property is reduced by around 1.4%, while the reduction in other types of crime lies
between 1.7% and 2.6%. The impact on property crime is the most stable across specifications and
the most statistically significant, while the impacts on violent crime and ‘other’ crimes are potentially
larger in magnitude but less precisely estimated. The analysis performed on this traditional crime
categorization indicates responses to preschool across all crime categories, and may suggest somewhat
higher ones among crime types which are tied to motivations beyond the economic reward, but lacks
the precision and the flexibility to draw stronger conclusions.
Given that our data allows us to do so, we go further and bring our analysis to a more detailed level,
beyond the traditional, broad classification. We propose an original categorization of crime actions
according to their relation with the cognitive and non-cognitive skill spectrum.27 The cognitive-skill
aggregate is composed of so-called “economic motivation” crimes (44.61%), which basically include
thefts and robberies, the category of “damages to property” (4.87%) and the category “fraud and
falsity” (4.54%). We expect crime rates in this aggregate to be particularly responsive to increased
preschool access if the main channel at work is an improvement in cognitive skills and consequently
in labor market outcomes.
Our second crime aggregate relates to the non-cognitive skill range, including those crime actions
behind which socio-emotional wellbeing, self-control, aggressive behavior, anger management and
related aspects are likely to play a key role. The categories included in this aggregate are “pure
violence” (18.71%) against other individuals such as injuries (physical violence) and threats (verbal
violence); “drugs/addictions”28 (2.59%); “sexual” crimes (0.57%) and “rules compliance” (17.91%), i.e.
crimes committed against the authority or various sets of rules and norms. Moreover, there are crimes
committed within family boundaries, separated into “gender violence” (1.27%) as defined by police
records, and the more generic crimes “against the family” (4.94%), which include mistreatments of
family members as well as failing the most basic family responsibilities. If preschool helped reducing
crime rates by endowing children with stronger non-cognitive skills, we would expect crimes in this
second aggregate to be particularly responsive to increased preschool access.29
27From the initial dataset we have deleted three typologies of crime with very small crime counts: crimes against
the environment (0.32%), murder (0.27%) and arson (0.06%). Beyond the small number of occurrences, it is difficult
to categorize these types across the typologies we propose.
28Children’s behavior at age 3 is surprisingly predictive of the risk of developing addictive behaviors like problem
gambling or drug misuse during adulthood, according to data from the Dunedin Study on nearly 1,000 people in New
Zealand (Slutske et al. 2012).
29The percentages reported (also presented in Table A.2) refer to the whole 2009-2014 period. Aggregated data also
show the total number of crimes divide into 50.52% of ‘non-cognitive’ crimes and 49.48% of ‘cognitive’ crimes.
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Table 6: The effect of early preschool access on crime rates, by type of crime (traditional categories)
Negative Binomial Poisson OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A) PROPERTY
Public preschool rate (0-3) –2.48*** –1.36* –1.35* –1.46* –1.18 –1.03 –32.86*
(0.29, ) (0.70, ) (0.71, ) (0.85, ) (0.93, ) (0.86, ) ,(17.17, )
B) VIOLENT
Public preschool rate (0-3) –3.45*** –1.10 –1.15 –1.97* –1.44 –0.11 –7.45
(0.29, ) (0.90, ) (0.91, ) (1.09, ) (1.30, ) (0.92, ) (9.58, )
C) OTHER
Public preschool rate (0-3) –4.46*** –1.70* –1.48 –1.14 –2.59** –2.18* –14.71
(0.32, ) (1.03, ) (0.98, ) (0.98, ) (1.24, ) (1.18, ) (8.98, )
Municipal controls 3 3 3 3
Region of origin controls 3 3 3
Year of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Region of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Province FE 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3
N.obs 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924
Note: SE clustered by municipality in parentheses. Each observation represents cohort ‘c’ born in
region ‘i’ living in Catalan municipality ‘m’ in year ‘y’. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 7 presents the results for these more disaggregated categories of offenses. Estimated impacts
of increased preschool access are negative across all crime categories and model specifications, with
some exceptions within “damages to property”, “gender violence” and “sexual crimes”. In these three
categories, positive but imprecisely estimated coefficients appear until region of origin controls are
added to the model.
We observe that, in general, the crime types which can be related to non-cognitive skills show
the largest and most significant estimated impacts of preschool access, with drug crimes and pure
violence leading both in terms of size and significance of the effect. A one percentage point increase
in preschool access reduces the number of violent crime actions by proportions around 2.5% and drug
crimes by proportions around 8% in youth and young adulthood. In sum, the results presented in
Table 7 suggest a powerful impact of the non-cognitive skills channel in explaining the reduction of
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Table 7: Cognitive versus non-cognitive channels
Negative Binomial Poisson OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
COGNITIVE
Economic motivation –2.33*** –1.58** –1.62** –1.41 –0.62 –0.81 –25.14*
(0.35, ) (0.77, ) (0.79, ) (0.93, ) (0.99, ) (0.94, ) ,(14.61, )
Damages to property 0.54 1.82 1.81 1.71 –0.06 0.18 –0.54
(0.56, ) (1.57, ) (1.65, ) (1.93, ) (2.33, ) (1.81, ) (3.46, )
Fraud and falsity –6.77*** –3.21** –2.64 –3.26* –3.39 –2.95 –7.20
(0.66, ) (1.61, ) (1.65, ) (1.87, ) (2.36, ) (1.85, ) (4.68, )
NON-COGNITIVE
Pure violence –2.86*** –1.58 –1.86* –2.76** –2.32* –0.79 –11.53
(0.33, ) (0.98, ) (1.00, ) (1.17, ) (1.36, ) (1.02, ) (7.84, )
Rules compliance –4.57*** –1.36 –1.13 –0.72 –2.37* –2.13* –12.24
(0.33, ) (1.10, ) (1.06, ) (1.07, ) (1.32, ) (1.22, ) (8.69, )
Drugs –3.22*** –6.98** –7.65*** –8.22*** –9.15** –2.89 –2.47
(0.92, ) (2.94, ) (2.91, ) (3.06, ) (3.71, ) (3.52, ) (2.10, )
Against the family –5.79*** –1.43 –1.08 –2.22 –0.41 0.78 1.26
(0.50, ) (1.64, ) (1.72, ) (2.22, ) (2.70, ) (1.64, ) (3.76, )
Gender violence –5.13*** 4.34 2.76 0.54 –1.47 5.64 3.23*
(1.03, ) (2.74, ) (3.15, ) (3.36, ) (3.63, ) (3.67, ) (1.95, )
Sexual crimes 1.87 0.87 0.10 4.43 –5.36 –1.20 –0.40
(1.96, ) (4.82, ) (5.09, ) (5.44, ) (6.36, ) (5.67, ) (0.71, )
Local controls 3 3 3 3
Region of origin controls 3 3 3
Year of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Region of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Province FE 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3
N.obs 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924
Note: The table reports early preschool exposure coefficient estimates for different types of crime.
The model specifications (columns) are the same used for our main results. SE clustered by mu-
nicipality in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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crimes rates we observe as a consequence of the improved access to a high quality public preschool
system.
7 Discussion
As reviewed in Section 2, the effectiveness of high-quality preschool programs in reducing crime during
youth and young adulthood is supported by several analyses of several US programs such as the Head
Start, the High Scope / Perry, the Abecedarian and the CARE projects. Due to the reduced sample
sizes and the necessarily disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds characterizing participation in
those studies, it is difficult to perform a direct comparison between their effect magnitudes and our
results, but all four programs were found to have led to strong and significant reductions both in
lifetime arrests and in self-reported misbehavior. Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002), who evaluate
the long-term effects of the Head Start program through sibling comparisons, find that self-reported
brushes with the law by age 30 are significantly lower for black participants who participated to
the program - but do not distinguish between different types of misdemeanors. Schweinhart et al.
(2005) looks at the Perry program and finds significant differences between participant and control
groups in crime rates, arrest rates and prison time, and across a wide range of crime types: violent,
property and drug crimes. These differences are found at various times of life: starting already in
adolescence, continuing over early adulthood and through midlife. Our particularly strong result on
drug crime reduction is in line with findings by Campbell et al. (2008; 2002), who identify large
and significant reductions in marijuana and other illegal substance abuse among young adults who
participated to the Abecedarian and CARE preschool projects. On the other hand, these authors
report no significant findings on self-reported violent behavior in their sample of analysis.
In line with the objective of the second part of our analysis, an influential paper by Heckman,
Pinto, and P. Savelyev (2013) proposes a decomposition of the effects of the Perry program into
cognitive skill- and personality skill-related. The authors show negligible effects of program-induced
increases in IQ in explaining treatment effects, among which important crime rate reductions. In
fact, while IQ enhancements through the Perry program had turned out short-termed, improve-
ments in personality skills had been found persistent by earlier studies (Carneiro and Heckman 2003;
Heckman 2000). The authors claim that the largest contributions to reduced criminal activity in
young adulthood – as well as better labor market outcomes and health behaviors – are attributable
to the substantial improvements in externalizing behaviors (aggressive, antisocial and rule-breaking
behavior) induced by the preschool program.
Compared to Heckman, Pinto, and P. Savelyev (2013), our analysis of the Spanish context has
both advantages and disadvantages. The most significant disadvantage is the unavailability of skill
data for our population of analysis: in this sense, we are missing an empirical measurement of
‘intermediate outcomes’ between preschool access in early childhood and criminal activities in young
29
adulthood. Being able to provide ‘first-stage evidence’ showing that the new Spanish public preschool
system introduced in the Nineties was able, like the Perry program, to boost non-cognitive skills in
its participants would represent a clear gain for this study. Instead, our focus goes directly to
the subsequent outcomes of improved socio-emotional competencies, and in particular to criminal
behavior. On the other hand, we are proposing a novel approach to infer the importance of the
cognitive versus non-cognitive skills channel in explaining effects on crime, taking advantage of the
high-quality crime data at our disposal. Contrary to the analyses by Heckman and coauthors, and to
other papers evaluating preschool programs in the same spirit, our crime categories are much finer
and more detailed, allowing to relate them to either skill group with a certain degree of confidence.
We view this as a novel and valuable contribution to the literature which, beyond being applied to
the evaluation of the Spanish preschool experience, may prove useful as a research method in other
contexts in which lack of intermediate skill outcomes is a limitation and rich crime data is available
instead.
A further aspect about our approach which is worth discussing is the fact that crime actions can
sometimes be driven by multiple or mixed motivations. For example, not paying spousal support to
the divorced partner – which in our classification is part of the offenses against the family – may
be driven by financial reasons or be a heated reaction to the separation events. Depending on the
particular case thus, the causes of failure to pay spousal support should be identified within the
cognitive sphere or among the non-cognitive set of skills. The classification we use, presented in
Tables 7 and A.2, is guided by criminology literature as well as common sense, and should be viewed
as our proposal on how to interpret empirical results.
Finally, it is worth dedicating some thoughts to the distribution of our treatment effect across
the population of Spanish children which was affected by the preschool expansion program. More
specifically, existing literature strongly suggests that children raised in rather disadvantaged socioeco-
nomic backgrounds are the ones benefiting the most from the introduction of good quality preschool
programs. In the Spanish case we are analyzing, the public preschool offer was not limited to spe-
cific socio-economic categories but open to all families. Unfortunately we are unable to carry out
an empirical heterogeneity analysis on this dimension, due to the unavailability of sociodemographic
information on offenders in our dataset. However, reaching back to the three factors determining the
results of a childcare expansion program, outlined by Blanden et al. (2016) and already introduced in
Section 3, we can develop some useful considerations. The first factor, the quality of provided public
childcare, is unlikely to help forming conjectures about which parts of the user population benefited
the most from the program: quality of childcare was the same for all users of the public system,
as rules and curricula were established centrally. On the other hand, the second and third factor,
i.e. quality of the alternative care solutions and quantity and quality of (lost) time with parents,
are more likely to give us hints about the direction of heterogeneity in our effects. We agree with
Blanden et al. (2016) in their observation that presumably the quality of alternative care received
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by children at home or with friends and the extended family differs by background, and that we
expect effects of a high quality formal childcare service to be more positive for children from fam-
ilies of lower socio-economic status. The same conclusion applies if we consider the lost time with
parents, which has been found to be of both higher quantity and quality for children raised in more
advantaged contexts (Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney 2008; Kimmel and Connelly 2007). In conclusion,
based on these considerations and even though we are unable to show this empirically, there are
reasons to think that in the Spanish context, like in others before, the public preschool expansion
program helped reducing inequalities in society by benefiting disadvantaged children more than those
from wealthier families. In turn, we conjecture the reduction in crime to be driven mainly by those
more disadvantaged children later in time, that is, by a reduction of criminal activity at the hand of
individuals raised in lower socio-economic backgrounds.
7.1 Cost-benefit calculations
The results obtained for the more disaggregated types of crime allows us to provide a back-of-the-
envelope cost-benefit analysis of the Spanish preschool expansion. In particular, we aim at relating
the economic value of crime reduction to the cost of the expansion.30
Without addressing thorough rates of return of the program,31 we limit ourselves to calculating
the average annual benefit-to-cost ratio over our period of observation (2009-2014). In Appendix D
we present the data used and the calculations performed to obtain an annual benefit-to-cost ratio for
a 1 percentage point expansion of a preschool enrollment rate. More precisely, we recover the unit
costs of crime by type and combine these with our estimates on the impact of increased preschool
access on crime actions, obtaining an assessment of the monetary value of reduced crime. We then
relate those benefits to the cost of the expansion program, based on unit costs of one extra preschool
spot in Spain.
For the case of Catalonia, a 1pp increase in public preschool enrollment rate would imply to
increase enrollment rates from 22.3% (for instance in the year 2000) to 23.3%, which translates into
4,710 new posts, with an associated yearly cost of 26.8M€ (a 0.1% of the regional budget in 2004).
Considering the information reported in Appendix Table A.8 and the fact that we are able to use
only approximately two thirds of the overall crime volume we use in the rest of the paper, the lower-
bound estimate of associated benefits is 113.9M€. That is, merely considering benefits from crime
30Being limited to the sole crime dimension, our exercise is much less comprehensive than the one performed by
Heckman, Moon, Pinto, P. A. Savelyev, et al. (2010) for the Perry Preschool Program, which considers a range of
benefits to society beyond crime reduction – such as better education, employment, earnings and health. Moreover,
we limit ourselves to the computation of cost-benefit ratios and do not
31This would imply the need to compute present values of lifetime costs and benefits of preschool expansion. In
our data we observe crime committed by individuals aged 15-30: even though it corresponds to the age range where
crime generally peaks, it still represents an incomplete share of the potential criminal life on an individual. Engaging
in more demanding imputation exercises in order to approximate lifetime criminal activity, in the spirit of Heckman,
Moon, Pinto, P. A. Savelyev, et al. (2010), lies beyond the scope of this paper.
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reduction, we estimate the benefit-to-cost ratio at around 4.25 at the very least.32 As a comparison,
only in terms of crime reduction, Heckman, Moon, Pinto, P. A. Savelyev, et al. (2010) report a
benefit-to-cost ratio of 7.333 for the Perry Program, while Rolnick and Grunewald (2003) obtain a
ratio of 5.7 for the same program.
Keeping in mind the limitations of the quite simplified approach taken in this exercise, we believe
it nonetheless helps us providing a useful lower-bound estimate of the economic advantages brought
about by the Spanish preschool expansion. Considering nothing else than the positive consequences
in terms of crime reduction, the monetary value of benefits to society exceed costs fourfold at the
very least.
8 Robustness checks and placebo tests
In this section we present a battery of robustness checks and placebo tests aimed at ruling out any
potential confounding elements which were not addressed in our main analysis.
In the first robustness check we estimate coefficients on total preschool access (public and private),
instead of using public preschool access only. The over-time average of total preschool access is twice
as high as the public one (see Table A.1), but as we described in Section 3, it was the expansion of
the public component mainly driving the cross-regional variation across our period of analysis. As
a result, we would not expect important changes in our results, and as we see in Table 8, row C1,
these remain indeed qualitatively unaltered. Coefficient magnitudes decrease as expected, reflecting
the higher mean of the new predictor variable.
In the second robustness check, we account for potentially nonrandom cross-regional mobility of
children between birth and age three, as anticipated in Section 5.1. Since we only have information
on the region of birth of offenders and population resident in Catalonia, but not on their residence
at age three, our cohort- and region of origin- specific analysis is developed under the assumption
that children born in a specific region still reside in that region at age three. Back in Table 2
we gave evidence for low mobility between ages 0 and 3 for our cohorts of analysis. Nevertheless,
for the sake of completeness, here we follow Card and Krueger (1992) and construct full migration
probability matrices between Spanish regions, using cohort and age-specific migration data from
residence variation records kept by the Spanish National Statistics Agency (Encuesta de Variaciones
32One can decompose that ratio distinguishing between “public” and “private” costs of crime – as described in the
Appendix section. Looking at the reduction in public costs only (37.1M€), we estimate the benefit-to-cost ratio around
1.4. Looking at the reduction in private costs from crime (76.8M€), the ratio would be around 2.9.
33See their Table 6. The case that best approximates our scenario is the ‘0% discount rate’ and Low Murder Costs.
In fact, our analysis does not include murders, whose costs to society are estimated to be very high in their analysis.
Similarly to the fact that we have cost estimates for only two thirds of overall crimes, excluding murders makes of our
benefit-to-cost estimate a clear lower bound of the real one. Simply imputing our average unitary crime cost to the
remaining third of crimes for which we are missing unit cost information, we would obtain a benefit-to-cost ratio to
6.33.
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Table 8: Preschool exposure estimates under different robustness checks and placebo tests.
Negative Binomial Poisson OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
C1) Total enrolment –1.86*** –1.27*** –1.24*** –1.35*** –1.36*** –1.09*** –43.04***
(0.14, ) (0.29, ) (0.30, ) (0.34, ) (0.40, ) (0.37, ) ,(14.21, )
C2) Mobility adjusted –3.21*** –1.59*** –1.58*** –1.63** –1.35* –0.99 –52.55**
(0.22, ) (0.54, ) (0.55, ) (0.64, ) (0.73, ) (0.65, ) ,(25.58, )
C3) Province level (Note) –2.00 –1.66 –1.90 –1.32 –1.17 –2.04 –14.57
(1.46, ) (1.45, ) (2.39, ) (2.49, ) (2.42, ) (1.43, ) (,107.44, )
C4) Catalonia level (Note) –0.73* –1.51 –1.45 - –1.61 –2.32 –233.78*
(0.44, ) (1.87, ) (1.90, ) - (1.93, ) (1.69, ) (,127.02, )
PLACEBO TESTS
D1) Later preschool –0.88*** –0.28 –0.22 –0.23 –0.27 –0.38* –27.82*
(0.31, ) (0.20, ) (0.18, ) (0.20, ) (0.19, ) (0.20, ) ,(15.20, )
D2) Random regions or cohorts: See Figure 6.
Local controls 3 3 3 3
Region of origin controls 3 3 3
Year of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Region of birth FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Province FE 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3
Mean(y) 29.69 29.69 29.69 29.69 29.69 29.69 29.69
sd(y) 160.02 160.02 160.02 160.02 160.02 160.02 160.02
N.obs 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924 153,924
Note: For provincial level specifications SE are clustered at provincial level. For regional level
specifications, no local fixed effects are included and SE are clustered by region of origin. See
descriptives for these two levels of aggregation in Table A.3. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Residenciales 1988-2000, INE).34 For each birth cohort c, the matrix P c cross-tabulates region of
34Complete yearly migration data is available for birth cohorts 1988 onward. Migration records for earlier cohorts
are missing for ages 0 (1987), 0-1 (1986), 0-2 (1985) and 0-3 (1984). To the missing records, we impute the age-specific
migration rates of the immediately younger cohort – which are likely to represent slight over-estimates of the true
rates, given that mobility trends are increasing over time.
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birth (i) and region of residence at age three (j), and its elements pcji indicate the probability of
residing in any region j at age three, while being born in region i. Based on these probabilities, for
each birth cohort c and region of origin i, we construct mobility-weighted preschool access measures




where Pc,j are the age three preschool exposure rates for cohort c in region j. We then re-estimate
our main regression models using P ∗c,i instead of the original, unweighted Pc,i, and report results in
Table 8, row C2. As we can see, estimates show only marginal changes with respect to the original
ones, confirming the inconsequential role played by preschool-age mobility in our context.
Our third and fourth robustness checks aim at testing whether our conclusions are sensitive to
changes in the level of geographical aggregation of our data. Row C3 and C4 in Table 8 show results
at the provincial and regional level respectively. Crime rates by birth cohort and region of origin,
as well as local economic controls, are now computed at these two higher geographical levels. Point
estimates remain in the same ballpark as the original ones at the municipality level, but standard
errors inflate. These checks confirm the absence of any spurious correlations specific to our municipal
level of analysis. At the same time, they reiterate the remarkable value of the unusual level of
geographical detail in the crime data we employ, which allows us to gain the necessary precision to
pin down statistically significant effects.
We conduct two placebo tests which have the aim of further convincing that our results reflect
genuine causality between preschool access and criminal behavior later in time. One concern may
be that the effect we find be driven by some omitted factors characterizing the region of origin -
birth year dimension, and later influencing crime. Our main analysis already made an effort towards
accounting for such factors by including region of origin and year-specific controls. If such factors
existed, be they economic, social or of any other nature, they would arguably influence not only age
3 preschool rates but also age 4-5 preschool rates, in any given year and region of origin. Therefore in
our first placebo test, on the right hand side we use the age 4 to 5 preschool exposure rates that were
recorded in each region of origin when our cohorts were aged 3. Row D1 of Table 8 shows absence
of any impact or empirical correlation with later criminal behavior of our 3-year olds. That is, an
impact of preschool access is found only when we employ the age-specific access rates which were
actually relevant to our cohorts back in their time and place, while no statistical relationship shows
when employing the access enjoyed by slightly older peers at the same time and place.
Our second placebo test addresses a more generic concern of accidental correlation happening in
our analysis. To check what type of results we would obtain in absence of any genuine relationship
between our preschool exposure rates and later criminal behavior, we run simulations by swapping
the real birth cohort or the real region of origin with a random different one, and show the results in
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Figure 6: Random birth cohort or region of origin assignment
 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
(a) Random birth cohort assignment
 
-4 -2 0 2 4
(b) Random region of origin assignment
Note: The two figures plot early preschool exposure coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals obtained from
our baseline model after randomizing birth cohorts (a) or region of origin (b) one-hundred times. In each sub-figure,
the black marker at the top represents our original estimate.
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Figure 6. In both experiments, we see that our original estimations (the first on top, in black) is far
off with respect to any of those simulated with fake years or regions of birth. In the case of random
birth years, estimates are concentrated around zero. In the case of random birth regions, if anything,
estimates tend to reach statistical significance on the positive side of the spectrum.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have estimated the impact of a nationwide preschool expansion program on crime
rates two decades later, using administrative education data for Spain and administrative crime data
for the region of Catalonia. The fact that the expansion was staggered across birth cohorts and
Spanish regions provides the key source of variation to our analysis, which is based on a multiple-
fixed-effects model.
Our main results indicate that for the average birth cohort of children, a 1 percentage point
increase in public preschool access at the region of origin yields 1.6% fewer crime actions during
youth and young adulthood. These results are in line with findings on several preschool initiatives
based in the US, such as the Perry, Head Start, Abecedarian and CARE projects – which have been
shown to lead to significant reductions in lifetime arrests and self-reported misbehavior. Our results
represent an important contribution to the knowledge on the topic, since we are demonstrating that
such benefits are not limited to well-known small-scale programs with highly selective access rules,
but instead remain sizable even in the circumstance of a nationwide, open-to-all public preschool
initiative.
Additionally, we have proposed a novel approach to infer the importance of the cognitive versus
non-cognitive skills channel in explaining the effects of increased preschool access on crime, taking
advantage of the unique level of detail of the crime data at our disposal. We relate each crime
type committed to either the cognitive or the non-cognitive skills sphere, according to which set of
skills is more likely to have influenced it and we look at our impact evaluation results separately by
categories. This approach may prove helpful in other research contexts in which direct measures of
cognitive and non-cognitive skills are not available.
We find that on average, crime types which can be related to the non-cognitive skills sphere show
the largest and most significant estimated impacts of preschool access, with drug crimes and pure
violence leading both in terms of size and significance of the effect. We interpret this as evidence
suggesting that the influence of preschool on the non-cognitive skill dimension is strong, persists into
adulthood and is powerful enough to display effects on antisocial behaviors.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
mean sd median
Crime actions /1,000pax 29.69 160.02 0.00
Property c. actions /1,000pax 13.05 99.81 0.00
Person c. actions /1,000pax 9.68 83.25 0.00
Other c. actions /1,000pax 6.95 64.82 0.00
Public preschool rate (0-3) 0.10 0.08 0.09
Mobility-adjusted public preschool rate (0-3) 0.10 0.08 0.09
Total preschool rate (0-3) 0.22 0.15 0.18
Public preschool rate (4-5) 0.62 0.12 0.60
Unemployed /1,000pax 76.78 29.27 77.31
Police /1,000pax 1.15 1.24 1.26
Municipal revenue pc (Thousands of E) 1.66 1.13 1.36
Municipal expenditure pc (Thousands of E) 1.63 1.12 1.35
Regional GDP pc at age 3 (Billions of E) 0.01 0.00 0.01
Regional unemployment (%) pc at age 3 18.30 5.61 18.02
N 153,924





































































































Note: The figure plots means (black) and standard deviations (gray) of crime rates by
region of origin. Dashed lines indicate overall mean and standard deviation.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics by crime typologies
Sample weight N Mean sd
PROPERTY CRIMES 54.01% 153,924 13.69 102.15







Damages to property (COG) 4.87% 153,924 1.79 31.98
Fraud and falsity (COG) 4.54% 153,924 2.03 37.59
VIOLENT CRIMES 25.49% 153,924 8.65 77.98
Pure violence (NON-COG) 18.71% 153,924 6.24 64.76
Injuries 12.50%
Threats 6.20%
Against the family (NON-COG) 4.94% 153,924 1.75 32.55
Mistreatments 3.93%
Missing family responsibilities 1.01%
Gender violence (NON-COG) 1.27% 153,924 0.50 16.62
Sexual crimes (NON-COG) 0.57% 153,924 0.15 8.67
OTHER CRIMES 20.50% 153,924 7.09 65.58
Rules compliance (NON-COG) 17.91% 153,924 6.48 62.37
Against road safety 10.11%
Public order 6.09%
Sentence break 1.00%
Against public administration 0.72%
Drugs (NON-COG) 2.59% 153,924 0.61 18.31
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Note: The figure plots sample fractions by birth cohorts (x-axes) and by region of origin (y-axes). Overall percentage
representation of each cohort and region is indicated in parentheses next to its label.
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics at higher geographical aggregation
Provincial level Regional level
mean sd median mean sd median
Crime actions /1,000pax 34.21 77.65 0 38.55 43.84 31.00
Unemployment /1,000pax 61.16 10.90 63.88 63.45 5.69 64.03
Police /1,000pax 1.64 0.74 1.73 1.69 0.33 1.76
Local revenue percapita (Thousands of E) 1.64 0.38 1.58 1.52 0.14 1.50




We assess how well our negative binomial (NB) model, in its baseline specification (eq(1)), is able to
fit the distribution of our crime data, and how it performs compared to the more traditional Poisson
choice. As a first approach, Table A.4 shows descriptive statistics of the predicted distribution of
count probabilities generated by the two modeling options, and compares it to the actually observed
counts. While the mean of the count distribution is well approximated by both the NB and the
Poisson models, the fit of the former is clearly superior to the fit of the latter when dispersion
measures are taken into account. The large standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of actual
counts are very well replicated by our NB specification, while the Poisson model fails to do so.
Table A.4: Descriptive statistics of empirical and predicted count distributions
Empirical distribution Negative Binomial model Poisson model
mean 0.000,1 0.000,1 0.000,1
standard deviation 0.026,3 0.026,1 0.004,7
skewness 31.565,0 31.531,3 5.621,9
kurtosis 997.894,9 996.447,3 36.171,0
max |difference| 0.023,0 0.830,6
value at max |difference| 0 1
mean |difference| 0.000,2 0.001,8
N 1,001 1,001 1,001
Model fit for count models can also be assessed through a rootogram (Tukey 1972, Tukey 1977,
Wainer 1974, Kleiber and Zeileis 2016), which compares the empirical distribution of a variable to a
theoretical distribution. The two theoretical distributions we consider are the Poisson distribution
and the NB distribution, characterized by our parameter estimates as of baseline specification eq(1).
Count residuals are computed as the difference between observed counts and the counts predicted
by the theoretical model. The rootograms in Figure A.3 plot the square root of these count residu-
als,35 36 with positive bars indicating underestimation of actual counts and negative bars indicating
overestimation of actual counts. The Poisson specification (right panel) massively underestimates
zero counts and considerably overestimates small counts. The NB model (left panel) performs signif-
icantly better, predicting zero counts quite well and over- or underestimating the remaining counts
to a lesser degree with respect to the Poisson model.
Finally, Table A.5 reports AIC and BIC for both model choices. Unsurprisingly, these criteria
too favor using the NB model over a Poisson specification in our context.
35The square root transformation prevents smaller counts to be obscured by larger counts in the graph.
36To improve readability, we show counts up to 100 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants.
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Note: The figure plots differences between observed and predicted counts produced by our baseline Negative Binomial
specification (left) and the alternative Poisson specification (right).
Table A.5: Bayesian and Akaike Information Criteria for the two modeling choices
BIC AIC
Poisson model 2.442 x107 2.442 x107
Negative Binomial model 4.684 x105 4.681 x105
Difference 2.395 x107 2.395 x107
Prefer NB model NB model
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C Additional supporting tables and figures
Figure A.4: Activity rates of women with at least one child 0-2 and % of 0-2 kids schooled per
province in 2001
Note: Horizontal axis: 0-2 preschool enrollment rates. Vertical axis: female activity
rate. Activity rates calculated with Labour Force Survey. Preschool enrollment rates
from the Ministry of Education (2002) and 2001 Census. Source: González (2003),
Gráfico 4, p.31.
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Table A.6: Characteristics of internal migrants by preschool exposure quintile
1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 5th Q
m sd/SE m sd/SE m sd/SE m sd/SE m sd/SE
Education: LS
Migrants 0.25 (.01, ) 0.25 (.01, ) 0.24 (.01, ) 0.31 (.01, ) 0.29 (.01, )
Stayers 0.26 (.00, ) 0.28 (.00, ) 0.25 (.00, ) 0.28 (.00, ) 0.29 (.00, )
Difference - 0.01** (.01, ) - 0.04*** (.01, ) - 0.00 (.01, ) 0.04 (.01, ) 0.00 (.01, )
Education: HS
Migrants 0.13 (.00, ) 0.22 (.01, ) 0.26 (.01, ) 0.29 (.01, ) 0.13 (.00, )
Stayers 0.13 (.00, ) 0.25 (.00, ) 0.24 (.00, ) 0.27 (.00, ) 0.16 (.00, )
Difference 0.00 (.00, ) - 0.04*** (.01, ) 0.03*** (.01, ) 0.03*** (.01, ) - 0.03*** (.00, )
Education: Uni
Migrants 0.48 (.01, ) 0.38 (.01, ) 0.34 (.01, ) 0.12 (.00, ) 0.05 (.00, )
Stayers 0.48 (.00, ) 0.32 (.00, ) 0.33 (.00, ) 0.13 (.00, ) 0.06 (.00, )
Difference 0.00 (.01, ) 0.06*** (.01, ) 0.01** (.01, ) - 0.01*** (.00, ) - 0.01*** (.00, )
Active
Migrants 0.62 (.01, ) 0.52 (.01, ) 0.50 (.01, ) 0.54 (.01, ) 0.80 (.01, )
Stayers 0.61 (.00, ) 0.47 (.00, ) 0.56 (.00, ) 0.69 (.00, ) 0.83 (.00, )
Difference 0.01 (.01, ) 0.05*** (.01, ) - 0.06*** (.01, ) - 0.15*** (.01, ) - 0.03*** (.01, )
Part-time
Migrants 0.21 (.01, ) 0.26 (.01, ) 0.30 (.01, ) 0.37 (.02, ) 0.31 (.03, )
Stayers 0.24 (.00, ) 0.29 (.00, ) 0.31 (.00, ) 0.36 (.01, ) 0.52 (.01, )
Difference - 0.03*** (.01, ) - 0.03*** (.01, ) - 0.00 (.01, ) 0.01 (.02, ) - 0.21*** (.03, )
Note: For internal migrants and stayers, the table presents shares of individuals by completed
education level (Lower Secondary, Higher Secondary, University or equivalent), activity status
(working or studying versus neither) and part-time work (yes or no) in each quintile of preschool
exposure. Source: 2011 Census microdata. In parentheses, standard deviation of the shares and
standard error of the differences between migrants and stayers.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Figure 5 shows this data graphically.
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Note: For internal migrants and stayers, the figure plots shares of individuals by completed education
level (Lower Secondary, Higher Secondary, University or equivalent), activity status (working or studying
versus neither) and part-time work (yes or no) in each quintile of preschool exposure. The difference in
shares is dotted, and 95% confidence intervals are capped. Source: 2011 Census microdata (5-Percent
Public Use Microdata Sample). Missing data points are due to having fewer than 10 individuals in the
migrants group.
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Table A.7: Preschool exposure and migrants’ characteristics
OUTCOME Odds ratio robust s.e. z p-value 95% c.i. N
2001 Census
Education level 0.03 0.11 –0.82 0.41 0.00 169.46 1,132
2011 Census
Education level 7.59 13.62 1.13 0.26 0.23 255.22 2,063
Active 3.67 10.51 0.45 0.65 0.73 2.06 1,632
Part-time 0.02 0.09 –0.86 0.39 0.00 164.01 814
Note: The table indicates the relationship, in proportional odds ratios, between different charac-
teristics of migrants and their preschool exposure at age 3, conditional on cohort and region of
bith fixed effects. Ordered logit model estimates for education level achieved [Less than primary
- Primary - Secondary - Specialization - University - Masters or higher]. Logit model estimates
for being active (employed or studying) and for having part-time a job [Yes - No].
.
D Benefit-to-cost calculations
To the best of our knowledge, estimates for the social costs of crime are not available for Spain,
and calculating these from scratch are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we make use of the
estimates for the UK provided by Heeks et al. (2018), which should serve as a good proxy: these are
estimates of how much a single crime action costs to society, including costs in anticipation of crime
(defense expenditure and insurance administration), costs as a consequence of the crime (value of
property stolen, physical and emotional harm, lost output, health services and victim services), and
costs in response to crime (police costs and judiciary costs). These unit cost estimates are provided
separately by crime type, and may be split into ‘private’ costs – associated with personal defense
expenditure, insurance administration, value of property stolen, physical and emotional harm and
lost output– and ‘public’ costs – associated with health services, victim services, police costs and
judiciary costs. Matching the crime categories available in Heeks et al. (2018) to those present in our
analysis,37 we obtain unit cost estimates for around two thirds of the total offenses recorded in our
sample, while the remaining third was not considered by Heeks et al. (2018).
We use our most conservative preschool impact estimates (Table 5, column 5) to approximate
the number of crimes avoided as a result of the preschool expansion,38 limiting ourselves to those
37We have matched what Heeks et al. (2018) define as “violence without injury” to our “threats”. When computing
the cost reduction impact of a preschool expansion we use for both injuries and threats the results we obtain for our
pure violence category. Similarly, for thefts, robberies and car thefts we use the estimated results for our economic
motivation category. Finally, we have assigned the unit costs of other sexual offenses to our gender violence typology
of crime.
38We use our point estimates and ignore the uncertainty around it.
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offenses we have cost estimates for. Lastly, we combine number of crimes avoided with unit costs
and obtain our estimates of cost of crime savings - which we report in Table A.8. The table shows
estimated total and public cost savings separately by crime type. Focusing on public unit costs of
crime for thefts is 900.7€ (46.4% of total costs); robberies 7,669.8€ (48.1%); car thefts 5,629.2€
(38.9%); criminal damage 830.3€ (43.7%) and for fraud and falsity is 422.2€ (23.3%). Regarding
non-cognitive crimes, for violent crimes we have injuries 4,813.0€ (24.3%); threats 3,293.1€ (39.5%);
sexual and gender violence 2,181.3€ (23.8%). For sexual crimes we have used the conservative cost
not including rapes whose estimated cost to society is six time higher.
In table A.8, the Multiplier column shows the inflation factors we use to obtain estimates of
the number of crimes actually occurred, based on our information on crimes reported and whose
offender is known. Note that both the likelihood of being reported to police and of having the
offender ascertained vary greatly by crime type. Using a second dataset for total reported crimes
in Catalonia, we obtain a first inflation factor from crimes with known offender to crimes reported.
Using multipliers calculated by Heeks et al. (2018) based on victimization surveys, we account for
the difference between reported and real crime rates. In Table A.8, we show the overall result of this
two-step inflation procedure.
To complete our cost-benefit exercise, we compare the savings due to crime reductions with a
cost estimate of the public preschool expansion. We take the average cost of a preschool post in
2004 in Catalonia from the analysis of Tarrach, Serra, and Baños (2011), who value it at 5,690.27€.
This estimate is consistent with the reported costs in Madrid in 2013.39 The main results of the
benefit-to-cost estimations of a preschool expansion are reported in the main text, Section 7.1.
39This unit cost is consistent with that reported in the news for Madrid in 2013 of 5.100€ see
https://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/08/27/madrid/1377605557.html (last visited March 2019). Moreover infor-
mal reports from 2017 point out to a cost of 7.000€ per year and pupil in public preschools in Barcelona, see
http://nadaesgratis.es/admin/tarifacion-social-de-las-guarderias (last visited March 2019). As a reference, the esti-
mated cost of the Perry Program per child in 2006 was $17,759 (see Heckman, Moon, Pinto, P. A. Savelyev, et al.
(2010)).
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Table A.8: Annual benefits in terms of crime reduction, by crime type
Crime type Totalunit cost (e)
Public






theft 1,942.1 900.7 81.1 10,317,486.2 4,784,921.1
robbery 15,930.6 7,669.8 57.2 27,474,533.2 13,227,580.0
car theft 14,481.1 5,629.2 33.4 3,284,053.8 1,276,600.1
damages 1,899.9 830.3 42.4 104,583.7 45,706.9
fraud 1,815.4 422.2 306.7 38,028,039.6 8,843,730.1
NonCognitive
injury 19,772.6 4,813.0 6.4 16,345,683.4 3,978,806.9
threats 8,345.3 3,293.1 7.3 3,885,788.0 1,533,346.4
sexual 9,175.6 2,181.3 77.9 9,656,182.5 2,295,564.8
gender violence 9,175.6 2,181.3 63.5 4,845,458.5 1,151,911.1
TOTAL 113,941,808.8 37,138,167.6
Note: Total and public costs obtained from Heeks et al. (2018) and are expressed in 2015 EUR (exchange
rate used 1GBP = 1.4073€ as of 31/06/2015). Crime used in this exercise account for two thirds of crime
with known offender recorded in Catalonia. The Multiplier inflates crime counts from those recorded by
police with a known offender to an estimate of those actually occurred. The Multiplier is composed of a
first inflation factor from crimes with known offender to crimes reported to police (calculated using ad-
ministrative data for Catalonia, at our disposal), and a second inflation factor from crimes reported to
police to total crimes (borrowed from Heeks et al. (2018)). Annual estimates of cost reductions are ob-
tained using impact estimates shown in column 5 in table 7 for the period 2009-2014, and are expressed
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